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Abstract 
In China, crop insurance is just a pilot program characterized by material cost-based coverage level and government-subsidized 
premium. To identify the efficiency of the crop insurance, we use the nonparametric density function model and estimate the 
probability of yield loss rate at 3 proposed levels for grain crop, wheat, corn, rice and cotton respectively from 13 provinces in 
the Major Grain-Producing Area. Besides, we point out some unfavorable factors for crop insurance management based on the 
Second National Agricultural Census data (2006).  Our finding is: the coverage level is on average no larger than 50% of the per
hectare crop production value while the probability of yield loss for each crop approaches to zero if the proposed yield loss rate
is larger than 40%, so the yield damage compensations are not necessary unless the huge catastrophes occur with the yield 
loss rate over 50%. Farmers could buy crop insurance to avoid big crop failure other than to maximize their returns. Therefore,
the current crop insurance coverage level under normal years could not create an effective inducement for farmers to purchase 
insurance contracts. To expand crop insurance participation, we consider that it is necessary to carry out positive and conditional
forced insurance, provide a larger portion of premium subsidy to the Major Grain-Producing Area by central government and 
improve the basic agricultural production conditions.   
© 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In the Major Grain-Producing Area (MGPA‡) of China, the rural households numbered 121740784, 
accounting for 65.4% of the national total and 93% were grain producers. The crop sown area is 105272 hectares, 
accounting for 69.1%. The grain crop sown area was 75628 hectares, accounting for 71.98%. For individual crops 
such as wheat, corn and rice, 68.4%, 78.7% and 75.3% respectively. The data mentioned are from the Second 
National Agricultural Census (SNAC, 2006) by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Compared to the other  
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regions, these MGPA figures exhibit a higher level of spatial farming risk accumulation and larger natural disaster 
pressures on farmers.  
Crop insurance is an important tool to alleviate natural disaster risks. There are three types of crop insurance 
in the world: cost insurance, yield insurance and revenue insurance, the yield insurance is widely used in about 
40 countries. In comparison, China experienced commercial crop insurance for many years and just began to 
try government-subsidized and material cost-based § crop insurance in 2004, which decides the coverage level 
according to the material cost incurred during crop production. At present, the material cost-based crop 
insurance has covered all MGPA provinces. Under the current policy of ‘low-premium, wide-coverage, low-
guarantee and low-indemnityÿ, the insurance program aims to restart the crop production and stabilize 
farmers’ living if the worst-case crop failure happens and not try to maximize their expected returns.  
Could the coverage level of material cost-based crop insurance be capable of offering adequate 
compensation for yield loss from catastrophe or encouraging farmers to purchase crop insurance? With the 
statistical model and risk factor analysis, this paper is to give a comprehensive evaluation on the efficiency of 
crop insurance in order to determine whether or not the crop insurance could be feasible. 
2.  Pilot Program of Material Cost-based Crop Insurance  
Owing to the ‘Regulations on Central Fiscal Subsidy to Crop Insurance Premium (2008)’ by the Ministry of 
Finance of China, a dramatic growth has occurred in crop insurance participation in China. From Table 1, the pilot 
crop insurance program provides farmers with plans covering major grain crops˄e.g. rice, corn, wheat and 
soybean˅and industrial crops (e.g. cotton, tobacco, cole and peanut). Per hectare material cost is as the baseline to 
set coverage level which could be larger than or equal to crop material cost. Practically, the provincial 
coverage level is basically larger than its material cost. The material cost accounts for about 30%-80% of  the 
total production cost, which means a low level of crop loss indemnity, and, the coverage level is on average no 
more than 50% of the per hectare crop production value. In fact, the actual yield per hectare is rarely less than 
70% of the average yield in the MGPA though actual yield varies by year and by region. Therefore, the current 
coverage level is incapable of offering adequate compensation for yield loss in case of catastrophe. The 
premium rate is generally set at provincial level in the insurance program. In China, rapid crop insurance 
development mainly stems from premium subsidy, in detail, the crop insurance premium is shared by farmers and all 
levels of governments (central, provincial and county administrative levels). Generally, central government’ share is 
35% the same across the country, provincial and county governments determine their share according to their own 
fiscal revenues. On average, all levels of governments together shoulder a portion of premium no less than 70% in 
order to remain affordable for farmers who are needed to pay only 20%-30% of the premium. That is, farmers had to 
pay for wheat, 30-60 Yuan per hectare; rice, 45-70; and corn, 45-60. Besides, the premiums are decided from past 
experiences and will be modified annually.
3. Probability of Yield Loss in the MGPA
3.1 Statistical Model 
The statistical estimation of yield loss risk follows three steps: 1) To capture the fitted trend yield. For the 
purpose of this study, this analysis initially considers alternative methods such as moving average, exponential 
smoothing and time series regression. We elect the following model (in t) for its higher 2R  goodness-of-fit  
§According to the Regulations of Central Fiscal Subsidies to Crop Insurance Premiums by the Ministry of Finance People’s Republic of China 
(2008), the material cost  includes seeds, chemical fertilizers, irrigationˈpesticidesˈmachine tillage and agrofilm, which are used for an 
insured crop during growing season. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Analysis on the Material Cost-Based Insurance Program for Selected Crops in 
the Major Grain-Producing Area of China, 2008 
Province Crop 
Coverage
Level
(Yuan/ha) 
Premium 
rate
(%) 
Premium
 Share  
(%) 
Material 
Cost 
(Yuan/ha)
Material Cost 
Ratio
(%) 
Coverage Level
Ratio
(%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hebei Wheat 
Corn 
Cotton
4500 
3900 
6000 
5
7
6.5
35:25:20:20 4335 
2409 
4535 
61.2 
68.8 
48.3 
53.3 
44.5 
35.4 
Inner
Mongolia 
Wheat 
Corn 
5250 
5250 
8
10 
35:25:30:10 5323 
3437 
61.0 
74.9 
50.9 
60.0 
Liaoning 
(Anshan) 
Rice
Corn 
Soybean 
6000 
4200 
2100 
8
13.4 
12.6 
35:25:20:20 4997 
2645 
1698 
41.4 
35.7 
44.6 
40.7 
43.3 
20.0 
Jilin Rice 
Corn 
Soybean 
4000 
3000 
2500 
8
10 
8
35:25:20:20 3677 
3190 
1805 
45.3 
42.3 
49.3
31.9 
36.5 
40.6 
Heilongjiang  Rice 
Corn 
Wheat 
Soybean 
3000 
2175 
1875 
1800 
7.5
10.35 
11.97 
12.52 
35:25:20:20 3240 
2033 
1983 
1629 
34.3 
44.9 
44.4 
45.3
22.2 
32.5 
42.0 
38.4 
Jiangsu 
(Yangzhou) 
Rice
Corn 
Wheat 
4500 
4500 
4500 
5
5
5
35:25:10:20 6000 
2635 
3600 
70.0 
42.8 
56.7 
31.7 
50.8 
52.9 
Anhui  Rice 
Wheat 
Corn 
4500 
3900 
3600 
5
4
5
35:25:20:20 4158 
3084 
1785 
54.8 
77.3 
77.6 
43.4 
48.7 
42.5 
Jiangxi Rice 3000 6 35:25:5:35 3300 45.4 32.0 
Shandong  Wheat 4500 5 35:25:20:20 4005 68.5 50.6 
Henan Rice 
Cotton
3630 
3375 
8
8
35:25:20:20 3603 
3356 
47.8 
29.7 
28.5 
22.0 
Hubei   Rice 3600 5 35:25:10:30 3356 57.3 42.6 
Hunan Rice 4200 6 40:25:10:25 3225 44.3 45.3 
Sichuan  Rice 
Corn 
4500 
4380 
5
5
35:20:20:25 2367 
2463 
81.4 
74.7
50.1 
62.1 
Sources: Data in (1) and (2) from the crop insurance policies of all provinces in the Major Grain-Producing Area, 2008; Data in (3) are the proporition 
of the premium shared respectively by governments at central-level, provincial-level, county-level and farmer; Data in (4) from the Agricultural 
Product Cost and Benefit Data Compiles of China, China Statistics Press, 2007;  Data in (5) equals (4) divided by the per hectare crop 
production cost; Data in (6) equals (1) divided by the per hectare crop production value. 
measure than other mentioned methods: 
tttt YttY HHDDD   ˆ2210                                                                    (1) 
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Where tY  is the actual yield in year t (t=1,2,Ă,24); iD , the slope coefficient; The detrend yield, achieved by 
the error term tH  ( tH = tt YY ˆ  ), is regarded as crop yield loss. To get optimal fitted trend yield tYˆ , we diagnose 
the series tH  to respectively identify the existence of heteroskedasticity and the nonstationary according to 
Goldfeld-Quandt test and ADF unit root test and correct them if necessary. 2) To attain the yield loss rate series 
by the formula tttt YYYy ˆ/)ˆ(  , so the observed sample set is ^ `Tt yyyy ,,, 21 " . 3) To estimate the probability of 
yield loss with nonparameter Kernel density information diffusion model which was used in many academic 
studies due to its objective basis and stable estimated results [2, 3, 4, 5 and 6]. Let universes of discourse for 
yield loss rate be:  
^ `nllll ,,, 21 "    ( ]1,0[l )                                                                       (2) 
Given that the yield loss information ty  diffuses to each point ( il ) according to Gaussian distribution, the 
information diffusion model can be expressed as:  
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Where h is the information diffusion coefficient (bandwidth) and determines the smoothness of density 
functionˈthe density function is smoother with the larger h. Choosing a proper h is a critical step for non-
parameter Kernel density estimation. There are alterative methods such as cross-validation, Silverman’s rule-of-
thumb and plug-in to choose h. This study adopts Silverman’s rule-of-thumb. According to the works of Barry G. 
K. and Alan P. K. [4]ˈif the Kernel function follows Gaussian distribution, the optimum smoothing parameter h is:
5/1
opt 06.1
| nh G                                                                                        (4) 
For equation (4), it is suggested that h could lead to better empirical result if the factor 1.06 being reduced to 0.9 
[5]. In this study, we choose 0.9 for h calculation. 
3.2Data and Estimation process  
This analysis employs the MGPA provincial yields of rice, wheat and corn published by the NBS during 
1985-2008. Let the universe of discourse be ^ ` ^ 1`,....,2.0,15.0,1.0,05.0,...,, 21   nllll , n=20. With the 
calculation procedure shown in Figure 1, we normalize information distribution of ty  by step (2), then step (3), 
(4) and (5) to achieve the yield loss probability )( ilP , which is presented in Table 2. 
3.3Estimation results 
As seen in Table 2ˈthe probability of crop yield loss decreases with the increase of proposed yield loss 
levels:η20%,η25% andη30% and approaches to zero if the proposed yield loss level is over 40% (so it is 
not listed) in the MGPA, which varies by crop and province. Compared to individual crops, the grain 
production is not more exposed to fluctuations. For grain crop, the probability with the loss larger than 30% of 
Figure 1. Calculation Procedure of )( ilP
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Table 2. Estimated Probability for Proposed Yield Loss of Selected Crops in the MGPA 
Province 
Grain Crop  Rice  Wheat  Corn 
η20% η25% η30%  η20% η25% η30%  η20% η25% η30%  η20% η25% η30%
Hebei 6.22 4.55 0.41  7.73 4.65 2.88 13.82 10.23 8.76  13.04 8.36 5.12 
Inner 
Mongolia 
2.31 1.03 0.56  5.68 4.83 3.45 21.44 15.30 10.97  15.22 9.74 6.66 
Liaoning 12.34 8.79 4.83  10.23 8.78 4.16 16.78 10.43 8.31  18.44 16.05 14.31
Jilin 15.93 8.77 5.45  23.03 17.63 12.15 23.78 16.70 11.23  19.18 14.43 9.64 
Heilong 
Jiang 
8.45 4.39 2.36  7.06 4.43 1.03 15.87 12.27 6.59  12.24 7.18 4.02 
Anhui 5.54 4.36 2.55  10.48 5.43 1.66 12.26 8.38 5.08  17.34 11.32 8.62 
Shandong 3.55 2.21 0.67  9.83 5.34 4.26 5.89 3.14 0.87  5.84 4.74 3.05 
Henan 7.66 5.24 3.78  15.62 13.43 10.71 10.13 8.46 2.75  13.42 11.45 8.35 
Hunan 5.34 2.20 1.03  5.02 3.17 1.23 7.75 5.31 1.36  14.38 6.86 2.13 
Sichuan 7.43 4.33 2.65  6.58 4.53 2.33 3.12 1.33 0.45  5.97 2.86 0.74 
Sources: China Statistics YearbookˈNational Bureau of Statistics of China, 1986-2009 
the grain yield is around 5% in Liaoning and Jilin, below 5% in the other provinces. For rice, 10.71% in Henan, 
12.15% in Jilin and below 5% in the other provinces. For wheat, 11.23% in Jilin, 10.97% in Inner Mongolia 
and for corn, 14.31% in Liaoning, under 10% in the other provinces. It is to say, the yield loss rate is usually 
not greater than 30% in the MGPA. 
4. Adverse Factors for Crop Insurance in the MGPA 
Based on the data from the Second National Agricultural Census of China, we could point out some adverse 
factors the crop insurance is faced with especially in the MGPA.   
4.1 Unfavorable basic conditions for insurance management 
4.1.1Small farm size. As shown in Table 3, the cultivated area per rural household is not up to 0.5 hectares in 9 
provinces, the top largest ones are in Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia and Jilin, respectively, 3.14, 2.2 and 1.65 
hectares, which are divided into 2 to 10 pieces due to the poor and fertile land collocation among rural 
households. Anhui province is very typical for 9.5 pieces out of 0.46 hectares on average. Obviously, small 
farm size hinders the use of modern agricultural sciences and technologies, enlarges production risks and 
enhances insurer’s management costs.  
4.1.2Serious information asymmetry. As the SNAC shows, the grain producers were 93% of 121740784 
national rural households in the MGPA, the lowest is 84% in Liaoning and the highest, 96% in Anhui, which 
indicates that the insurers have to be faced with numerous farming households of heterogeneous preferences 
and different risk levels and the existence of serious adverse selections and moral hazards. This situation leads 
to a high insurance management cost for crop insurance companies. 
4.1.3Poor anti-adverse conditions. Fragile production conditions leave crop growth vulnerable to meteorological 
disaster attacks. In China’s agriculture, the frequency of disasters was 12.5% in the 1950s and increased year after 
year, 79% during 1980-2006 and almost 100% since 1990s. Of the disaster affected sown area, the drought stricken 
area usually accounts for about 50%. In the MGPA, the disaster level is higher than that of the national average. In 
2006, the proportion of drought stricken sown area was more than 50% in 9 provinces, especially, up to 84% in 
Sichuan province. It is revealed from Table 3 by the SNAC that the village-level water conservancy facilities can 
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explain some about the drought and flood disaster damages. The MGPA field condition is obviously better for the 
rate of sloping cultivated land with slope degree 0~15° in the most MGPA provinces is larger than the national level 
as well as the rate of sloping and terraced land with the slope 0-15° and the paddy and irrigated field rate, which 
seems to be an advantage to resist drought and flood hazards. Besides, the lower village rates without water resource 
for irrigation and with water safety in normal years are advantages. However, the low village rate with irrigation and 
drainage stations is probably a major cause under extreme weather conditions which occurs in recent years. 
Table 3. Risk Features on Crop Production Conditions, 2006 
MGPA 
Farm Size  Conditions of Drought and Flood Prevention
Cultivated 
Area 
(ha/ 
household)
Cultivated 
Land  
Subdivision
(piece/ 
 Household)
 Rate of 
Paddy 
and
Irrigated  
Land  
(%) 
Rate of 
Sloping 
Cultivated 
Land            
with Slope 
Degree 0~15° 
(%) 
Rate of 
Terraced 
Field with 
Slope
Degree 
0~15°
(%)
Village Rate 
without 
Sources of 
Irrigation 
(%) 
Village Rate 
with Water 
Safety in 
Normal 
Years 
(%)
Village Rate 
with 
Irrigation 
and Drainage 
Stations 
(%) 
Hebei 0.48 5.0 57.9 15.9 82.1   7.0 87.2   7.8 
Inner
Mongolia 2.20 
3.3 26.7 99.3     0.0 10.9 77.1   4.9 
Liaoning 0.72 1.9 19.7 88.1     9.6   2.9 92.4 
13.1 
Jilin 1.65 
3.2 13.9 97.4     0.0   3.4 90.6   9.9 
Heilongjiang 3.14 
(NA) 11.6 99.1     0.0   8.3 85.4   6.8 
Jiangsu 0.38 
3.7 75.5 99.7     0.0   2.8 94.9 73.0 
Anhui 0.52 
9.5 49.6 86.4 10.2   1.7 92.2 29.4 
Jiangsu 0.44 
6.0 86.3 14.3 70.7   1.2 87.6 31.1 
Shandong 0.40 4.6 62.1 87.9   10.4   2.8 93.3 10.1 
Henan 0.43 
3.2 48.8 90.5     8.2   9.4 84.3   7.5 
Hubei 0.56 
7.1 59.9 61.6   21.5   7.8 80.5 39.0 
Hunan 0.34 
(NA) 78.3 48.0   41.7   3.7 78.9 26.0 
Sichuan 0.39 9.1 49.1 33.7   34.9   7.9 
79.9 25.1 
National 0.61 (NA) 44.9 66.6   20.9 11.0 79.5 18.0 
Sources: Calculated by authors using data from the Comprehensive Summary of the Second National Agricultural Census (China Statistics Press, 
2008) and the project ‘Survey of Grain Reserves’ with a sample size of 7500 rural households in China by the Centre for Rural Development 
Policy (China Agricultural University, 2004) 
Note: NA represents no data available
4.1.4High farming specialization. In China, the grain crop sown area decreased from 81.1% of the national 
total in 1996 to 75.9% of the national total in 2006, the difference is 5.2%. For individual crops, rice sown area 
decreased by 2.1% and wheat, 4%. In contrast, the sown area for corn, soybean and cotton increased by 3%ˈ
0.5% and 1.3% respectively. In the MGPA, the overall crop sown area increased from 67.7% to 69.1% of the 
national total. The grain crop sown area changed from 70% to 72%; rice, from 63.8% to 68.4%; wheat, from 
74.9% to 78.7% and corn, from 76.7% to 75.2%. With the change for crop planting structure, the MGPA’s 
share in the national crop sown area rose.  
4.2 Low Application level of Agricultural Science and Technology 
The use of agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers and pesticides plays an important role in reducing 
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natural disaster in busy farming season. During the period 1996-2006, we expanded the national machine 
ploughed area rate from 40.8% to 58.6% of the cultivated land; electromechanical irrigated area remained almost 
unchanged; machine sown area and machine harvested area were increased by 16.4% and 12.9%. Besides, the 
sprinkling and drip irrigation area accounted for a small proportion of cultivated land, only 1.8% and 0.8% 
respectively. Agrofilm, chemical fertilizer and pesticide use increased rapidly during the 10 years. Chemical 
fertilizer consumption grew annually by 2.2%. Pesticide application increased annually at the speed of nearly 10%. 
Chemical fertilizers, pesticides and fertilizer inputs have been close to or exceeded the application levels in some  
Table 4. Application Levels of Agricultural Science and Technology, 2006 
Region 
Cultivated Area Sown Area 
Machine 
Ploughed 
 Rate 
˄%˅
Electromechanical 
Irrigated 
 Rate  
˄%˅
Machine 
Sown
Rate
˄%˅
Machine 
Harvested
Rate
˄%˅
Agrofilm
Coverage
 Rate 
˄%˅
Coverage Rate 
by Small and 
Medium-sized 
Plastic Green 
Houses ˄%˅
Fertilizer
Purchase 
˄kg/ha˅
Pesticide 
Purchase
(kg/ha˅
Hebei 82.1 67.2 65.6 33.0  8.4 0.27 667.5 9
Inner
Mongolia 
68.0 20.7 58.5 17.3  6.7 0.03 327.0 1.95 
Liaoning 58.5 15.1 29.9  0.7  1.5 0.17 696.0 8.7 
Jilin 62.0 11.8 33.1  2.5  3.9 0.04 541.5 5.85 
Heilongjiang 87.1  7.4 73.2 29.6  0.3 0.07 237.0 2.7
Jiangsu 82.3 59.9 20.2 58.6  2.2 0.19 994.5 17.6 
Anhui 79.6 32.7 36.9 49.4  1.1 0.15 658.5 11.6 
Jiangsu 29.7 16.2  0.1 12.8  0.7 0.15 580.5 17.6 
Shandong 88.9 66.7 48.2 35.9 11.9 0.38 898.5 13.4 
Henan 86.4 50.0 48.4 39.3  1.6 0.09 697.5 7.5 
Hubei 34.1 29.3  1.3 19.5  1.5 0.10 846.0 14.1 
Hunan 31.4 14.7  0.1 18.8  1.2 0.04 612.0 17.7 
Sichuan 10.5  9.8  0.4  5.2  3.1 0.13 637.5 7.7 
MGPA 66.9 35.2 34.8 16.1  3.4 0.15 643.5 10.1 
National 58.6 26.7 30.8 23.3  4.8 0.14 640.5 10.4 
Source˖Comprehensive Summary of the Second National Agricultural Census, China Statistics Press, 2008 
developed countries. Agrofilm coverage area increased annually by 0.9% and the small and median-sized agrofilm 
green house coverage area increased greatly but remained at very low level. In the MGPA, the agrofilm and green 
house coverage rate were slightly higher than or the same as the national level. Only the proportions of machine 
plagued, electromechanic irrigated and machine sown area were higher than the national level. 
4.3Tight  income constraint 
Over the many years, per capita net income on national average for rural household remains little, only 1926 
Yuan in 1996 and 4140 Yuan in 2008. During the same period, per capita disposable income for urban household 
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grew from 4838.9 to 13785.8 Yuan. The absolute income difference between the rural and urban expanded from 
2912.9 to 9645.9 Yuan. Compared the income level with other sectors in 2006, the net income for rural household is 
only 25.5% of the national average earning for employed persons in all sectors,  26.2% in mining, 31.3% in 
construction and 27.8% in services to households and other services. As for the per capita net income composition 
for rural household, in the period 1996- 2006, the proportion of farming income dropped from 48% to 32.2% and the 
proportion of wage income rose from 23.4% to 38.3%.  
Table 5. Economic Restraints for Rural Households, 2006 
Province 
Per Capita Annual Net Income Per Capita 
Consumption Payout 
 (Yuan) Total (Yuan) Farming Earning’s share (%) Wage’s share (%) 
Hebei 3801.82 39.2 39.8 2495.33 
Inner Mongolia 3341.88 (NA) 
17.7
2771.97 
Liaoning 4090.4 35.0 36.7 3066.87 
Jilin 3641.13 56.6 16.6 2700.66 
Heilongjiang 3552.43 (NA) 18.4 2618.19 
Jiangsu 5813.23 17.2 53.4 4135.21 
Anhui 2969.08 (NA) 39.9 2420.94 
Jiangsu 3459.53 45.5 41.7 2676.6 
Shandong 4368.33 (NA) 38.3 3143.8 
Henan 3261.03 (NA) 31.4 2229.28 
Hubei 3419.35 (NA) 35.1 2732.46 
Hunan 3389.62 (NA) 42.8 3013.32 
Sichuan 3002.38 44.0 40.6 2395.04 
National Average 3587.04 32.2 38.3 2829.02 
Source˖1ˊChina Statistical YearbookˈNational Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007. 
Note: NA represents no data available. 
Table 5 lists the per capita net income and consumption payout in a rural household of the MGPA in 2006. We 
can see that farming income and wage income constitute the overwhelming share of the total net income. Wage 
income contribution is significant and keeps increasing with the rural labour force’ transfer to non-agricultural fields. 
In addition, rural household’s remaining income is little after deducting daily family consumption. The remaining is 
only 758 Yuan for national average; 900.8 Yuan for the MGPA; Jiangsu, with the peak of 1678 Yuan; Hunan, the 
least, only 376.3 Yuan, which affects farmers’ demand for crop insurance.  
4.4 Low level of Farmer Organization 
In order to alleviate information asymmetry risk, expand crop insurance coverage, reduce management 
costs and thereby enhance the efficiency of crop insurance, a favourable way is to organize the numerous 
farmers by some “organizers” as government, strong leading enterprises or specialized cooperative economic 
organizations. As we known, in Japan, almost 100% of the farmers are the member of some cooperative 
economic organizations [7]. According to the SNAC in 2006, 12723 rural towns built specialized cooperative 
economic organizations, of which 5636 were entities, accounting for 36.6% and 16.2% of the total towns 
respectively. Therefore, about 63.4% of the total towns did not have any organizations. In the MGPA provinces, 
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the indicator was 40% on average, slightly higher than the national average, and varied across provinces, as in 
Jiangsu, the highest, 70%; Shandong, 54.3%; Jilin, 51.8%; Anhui, 49%; Hebei, the lowest, 22.7% and the 
others, approximately 40%. The proportion of towns with entity is 45% in Jiangsu, 28.3% in Shandong, 26.4% 
in Jilin, 23.6% in Anhui, only 8.9% in Hebei and the othersˈunder 20%. These data reveal that farmers’ 
organization degree universally remains low, the majority of farmers make their production decisions at 
family-level. 
  5. Efficiency Evaluation of the Crop Insurance  
In the crop insurance practice, it is essential to determine proper coverage level and affordable premium. 
By positive analysis, we could illustrate that the policy-oriented crop insurance is not only questionable, but 
probably results in inefficiency, unfairness and financial problem etc.. We give basic judges to the insurance 
participators: government, farmers and insurance companies.  
(1) Government at all levels. Because subsidy could reduce the premium payment and hence encourage more 
farmers to purchase crop insurance, the government-subsidized crop insurance is an acceptable policy alternative. 
However, as aforementioned, the central fiscal’s share of premium rate equals 35% the same for all provinces in 
China. As a result, the MGPA provinces unfairly burden more insurance premium due to greater crop planting 
acreage. In fact, the provincial and county-level premium subsidies are faced with fiscally insufficient in the 
MGPA.
 (2) Farmers. In the MGPA, farmers get a larger portion of income from crop production, therefore, unstable 
yields make farmers’ lives more fluctuant thereby the government support becomes more essential, the policy-
oriented crop insurance is potentially demanded. But under the current low-premium and low-indemnity policy, 
the coverage level is set 30%-80% of the crop production cost. Following Funing Zhong’s work [1], there is no 
damage indemnity for cotton or grain crops if the coverage level is at 50%, and a little damage indemnity, at 70%, 
which are consistent with the conclusion drawn from Table 2. For farmers who have knowledge about usual yield 
loss rate, the coverage level isn’t high enough to induce them to participate in crop insurance.  
 (3) Insurance companies. Insurance companies control risks by collecting large amount of independent 
and identically distributed risk units. In the MGPA, one big problem the insurance companies are faced with is 
the low participation rate and high loss indemnity. The systematic risks in high frequency partly come from the 
poor agricultural infrastructure and high planting index. And, the high management cost results from numerous 
crop planters, small farm size, low farmers’ organization level and serious moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Unfavorable insurance operation circumstances bring insurers great financial pressure. 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
This study shows that China's pilot crop insurance is characterized by the material cost-based coverage. 
The levels of both premium and indemnity are quite low, the yield damage compensations are not necessary 
unless the huge catastrophes occur with the yield loss rate over 50%. Therefore, farmers mainly buy crop insurance 
to avoid the great crop failure other than to maximize their returns. Meanwhile, due to the fixed premium, unfair 
premium burden and unfavorable insurance conditions, the crop insurance policy lacks an effective incentive 
which leads to passive insurance supply and participation. Here are some implications to enhance the 
efficiency of crop insurance: 
   (1) Reasonable subsidy policy slope should benefit crop insurance in the MGPA. For an increasing portion of 
grain production in the MGPA, farmers are faced with greater risks, which means more potential demand for 
crop insurance and more burden of premium subsidies on governments at all levels. Therefore, it is reasonable 
for central government to give the MGPA more premium subsidy to reduce local fiscal pressure and balance 
unfair burden. 
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(2) It is a necessary consideration to adopt conditional and compulsory crop insurance policy. Using for 
reference the successful experiences in Japan, the compulsory crop insurance is a suboptimum choice for 
expanding insurance coverage. In the MGPA, along with special grain production supporting policies, such as 
microfinance and direct grain allowance, the compulsory crop insurance is expected to improve the situation of 
low participation rate if major crops, such as wheat, corn and rice, are required to be insured under some well 
designed policies. 
(3) Crop production conditions should be improved to optimize the circumstances of crop insurance. From the 
perspective of reducing the hazard indemnity, irrigation and water conservancy facilities are the top important 
measures needed to be emphasized for the frequent and serious drought and flood disasters. Another key way is to 
induce more farmers into cooperative economic organizations, in some degree, to promote the efficiency of crop 
insurance and ensure its sustainable and stable development.  
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